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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the twenty-five percent statutory cap on foreign
voting equity in U.S. airlines has received much attention. Support-
ers of the cap claim it protects national security interests by limiting
foreign control over U.S. air routes, and that it protects U.S. jobs by
effectively preventing foreign airlines from absorbing the operations
of domestic air carriers. Opponents claim it is overly protectionist
and outdated, and unnecessarily prohibits U.S. airlines from tapping
foreign sources of much-needed capital.
In its final report to the President and Congress, the National
Commission to Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry1
joined the fray:
We recommend [that the] Federal Aviation Act be
amended to allow the U.S. to negotiate bilateral agree-
ments2 that permit foreign investors to hold up to 49 per-
The Commission's final report was released on August 19, 1993. The ninety-day
Commission was established to study the U.S. airline industry and to provide recommenda-
tions on what the new administration can do to reform the industry. The Secretary of Trans-
portation called the Commission "the policy vehicle for where we are going." Mead Jen-
nings, U.S. Airline Policy is Still Up for Grabs, AIRLINE Bus., Sept. 1993, at 26.
2 International air routes are negotiated in bilateral treaties between the origin and
destination countries. Liberal bilateral treaties place few limits on the flights and routings
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cent voting equity in U.S. airlines, providing those bilateral
agreements are liberal and contain equivalent opportuni-
ties for U.S. airlines; the foreign investor is not govern-
ment-owned; there are reciprocal investment rights for
U.S. airlines, and the investment will advance the national
interest and the development of a liberal global regime for
air services.
The Commission's recommendation will certainly fuel the foreign
ownership debate. This debate has intensified since the late 1980s
because of large scale alliances between U.S. and foreign airlines,
including links between Northwest Airlines and KLM Royal Dutch
Airlines (KLM), and between USAir and British Airways (BA).
Deciding whether foreign investment in a U.S. airline will af-
fect a carrier's U.S. citizenship is not, however, contingent merely
on whether the current twenty-five percent foreign ownership cap is
being met.4 The Civil Aeronautics Board (C.A.B.) and its successor,
the Department of Transportation (D.O.T.), have interpreted the
citizenship test of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958' as requiring
two separate determinations. First, certain numerical standards
must be met: Seventy-five percent of the airline's voting interest
must be owned and controlled by U.S. citizens, and its president and
two-thirds of its board of directors must also be U.S. citizens.6 Sec-
ond, the structure of the investment deal is closely analyzed by the
that airlines of either signatory country may choose to fly. Restrictive bilateral treaties limit
flights, routes, pricing, and expansion of services between the two nations. See generally
Richard M. Weintraub, Flying High Over Europe, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1993, at Hi.
' "Change, Challenge and Competition: A Report to the President and Congress,"
The National Commission to Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry, Aug. 1993, at
22.
, Section 1301(3) of the Federal Aviation Act requires an air carrier to be a U.S.
citizen. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301(3) (1983 & Supp. 1988). Section 1301(16) sets out the
definition of citizenship: "'Citizen' of the United States means (a) an individual who is a
citizen of the United States or of one of its possessions, or (b) a partnership of which each
member is such an individual, or (c) a corporation or association created or organized under
the laws of the United States or of any State, Territory, or possession of the United States,
of which the president and two-thirds or more of the board of directors and other managing
officers thereof are such individuals and in which at least 75 per centum of the voting inter-
est is owned or controlled by persons who are citizens of the United States or of one of its
possessions." 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301(16) (1983 & Supp. 1988).
5 49 U.S.C. app. §1 1301-1557 (1983 & Supp. 1988).
6 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301(16) (1983 & Supp. 1988).
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government to ensure that the foreign investor will not have the po-
tential to directly or indirectly control the carrier. It is this "con-
trol" prong of the U.S. citizenship test that causes the most
problems for foreign investors.
This paper examines the evolution of the U.S. air carrier citi-
zenship test. Part I briefly explores the historical roots of the limits
on foreign ownership. Part II traces the development of the law on
foreign investment in U.S. airlines before the late 1980s when most
citizenship cases involved non-airline foreigners investing in rela-
tively small U.S. air carriers. Part III takes an in-depth look at the
developments in the law since the late 1980s, when most citizenship
cases involved major foreign air carriers investing in major U.S.
airlines.
II. HISTORICAL BASIS OF AIRLINE OWNERSHIP
RESTRICTIONS
Current law on foreign ownership of U.S. air carriers is based
on the political thinking of the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s. As commer-
cial aviation took shape in the mid-to-late 1920s, the first restric-
tions on foreign ownership of U.S. air carriers began to appear in
congressional discussions. Congress "initiated the citizenship re-
quirement to assure aircraft availability for national defense pur-
poses."' Members of Congress and the military "advocated govern-
ment intervention in commercial air carrier development for the
dual purpose of training a reserve corps of pilots and maintaining an
auxiliary air force for United States military service during national
emergencies." 8 From these military concerns, they derived the need
for citizenship requirements for air carriers, to prevent foreign con-
trol over an "auxiliary" of the country's military.9 The Air Coin-
I James E. Gjerset, Comment, Crippling United States Airlines: Archaic Interpreta-
tions of the Federal Aviation Act's Restriction on Foreign Capital Investments, 7 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 173, 180 (1991); see Inquiry into Operations of the United States Air
Services: Hearing Before the House Select Committee of Inquiry into Operations of the
United States Air Services, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 527 (1925) (statement of Major General
M. Patrick, Chief of the Army Air Service).
8 Gjerset, supra note 7, at 181.
Id.
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merce Act of 192610 codified these rules, requiring air carriers to
maintain fifty-one percent of voting stock under U.S. citizenship and
a sixty-six and two-thirds percent U.S. citizen contingent on their
board of directors. 1
Military protectionism was replaced by economic protectionism
during the New Deal era in the 1930s. Calls for increased protec-
tion of the airline industry and for making airlines "a part of the
commercial arm of the nation"' 2 were frequently heard. In response,
the Civil Aeronautics Act of 193811 increased from fifty-one percent
to seventy-five percent the amount of an airline's voting stock that
must be in U.S. hands for the carrier to be able to qualify as a U.S.
operator."'
The issues of foreign investment in and cross-border ownership
of air carriers were first raised in multilateral discussions during the
Chicago Convention of 1944."5 For the first time, a number of na-
tions gathered together to establish international aviation accords. 6
Since World War II was still underway, much talk of regulating
airspace focused on national security concerns rather than economic
protectionism. U.S. officials wanted to assure the safety of U.S. air-
space from operations by enemy states.' 7 The United States sought
the right to prohibit carriers from operating "if substantial owner-
ship and effective control raised questions of a political nature or a
threat to national security."' 8 Germany and Italy were the main
targets of these sentiments, particularly because they had extensive
ties to Latin American airlines operating within the U.S. sphere of
influence. Latin American countries, however, benefitted from large
foreign investments in their carriers, including investments by Pan
10 Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, §§ 1-14, 44 Stat. 568 (1926)
(previously 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 171-84 (West 1951) (repealed 1958)).
11 Id.
12 Aviation: Hearing on H.R. 5234 and H.R. 4652 Before the Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1937) quoted in Gjerset, supra note 7, at
183.
13 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 76-706, 52 Stat. 977 (codified at 49
U.S.C. app. § 1301(16) (1988)).
14 Id.
"' Dr. Marc L.J. Dierikx, Bermuda Bias: Substantial Ownership and Effective Con-
trol 45 Years On, 16 AIR L. 118, 119 (1991).
10 Windle Turley, AVIATION LITIGATION, § 6.05 (1986).
17 Dierikx, supra note 15, at 119.
Is Id.
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Am and TWA,' 9 and successfully opposed the inclusion of foreign
ownership restrictions in the Chicago Convention.20
The Bermuda Convention of 1946, held between the United
States and the United Kingdom to negotiate a bilateral aviation
route accord, marked the first time language for ownership and ef-
fective control of air carriers was articulated in a treaty.21 Unfortu-
nately, the wording of the applicable provision in the Bermuda
Agreement was vague and subject to various interpretations.22 The
United States interpreted it as a political control against ownership
by ex-enemy states; the United Kingdom viewed it as an economic
shield preventing aviation from falling under the control of a few
countries.2" In subsequent discussions on the meaning of this provi-
sion, both governments concluded that it allowed either government
to limit or prevent a foreign owned carrier from operating between
the two countries. Apparently, the United Kingdom and the United
States did not want to preclude cross-ownership in international civil
aviation, but simply wanted veto power in the event that they be-
lieved their political and/or economic interests were being
violated.24
By the early 1950s, however, the United States and other na-
tions began to narrow their interpretations of citizenship restrictions
on air carrier owners. The United States felt particularly uncom-
fortable about the prospect of granting rights to a country that
would subsequently become unfriendly to the United States"2 5 This
stance grew out of the Cold War and uncertainties surrounding
countries susceptible to a growing Communist influence. In response
to these fears, the United States and the United Kingdom set forth
a new interpretation of the Bermuda Agreement "emphasizing a re-
19 Id. at 120.
2 Id. at 121.
" "Each Contracting Party reserves the right to withhold or revoke the exercise of
the rights specified in the Annex to this Agreement by a carrier designated by the other
Contracting Party in the event that it is not satisfied that substantial ownership and effec-
tive control of such carriers are vested in nationals of either Contracting Party ... I." d. at
121, note 11 (alteration in original).
22 Id.
2I Id. at 123.
24 Id. at 122.
26 Id. at 123.
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strictive interpretation of substantial ownership and effective con-
trol, based on the political realm of East-West relations." z
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 " replaced the Civil Aero-
nautics Act of 1938, maintaining the twenty-five percent limit on
voting control of a foreign investor in a U.S. carrier. 28 The Federal
Aviation Act's twenty-five percent cap on foreign voting equity in
U.S. airlines is still in effect today.
II. CASE PRECEDENT BEFORE THE LATE 1980S
The Civil Aeronautics Board (C.A.B) and the Department of
Transportation (D.O.T.) have decided each citizenship case on the
basis of its particular facts.29 The D.O.T. has stated that by simply
meeting the percentage requirements of the Federal Aviation Act,
an airline still may not qualify for U.S. citizenship if foreign nation-
als control the airline through the ownership of non-voting stock,
debt, or other means.30
An early test of the Federal Aviation Act's foreign ownership
rule came in 1971 with the application of the Interamerican Air-
freight Company to the C.A.B. for a U.S. permit."1 Willye Peter
Daetwyler, a Swiss citizen, owned twenty-five percent of the voting
stock of the Interamerican Airfreight Company, which he had
formed. 2 Daetwyler also represented one-third of the company's
board of directors. The other key players in the company (share-
"' Id. at 124. Shortly thereafter, U.S. majority holdings in foreign carriers were re-
quired to be divested. For example, Pan American was required to shed its interests in sev-
eral Latin American carriers. See Havana-New York Air Carrier Permit Case, 16 C.A.B.
371 (1952); see also Compania Cubana de Aviacion, Air Carrier Permit, 20 C.A.B. 482,
486 (1955) (stating C.A.B. policy to be that substantial ownership and effective control of
foreign air carriers should preferably be vested in nationals of the country of origin).
49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1557 (1983 & Supp. 1988).
28 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301(16) (1983 & Supp. 1988).
, Michael J. Roberts, Foreign Investment in U.S. Airlines: Change in the Wings?, 58
TRANSP. PRAC. J. 251 (1991).
80 Jeffrey D. Brown, Note, Foreign Investment in U.S. Airlines, 41 SYRACUSE L. REV.
1269, 1275 (1990).
"I Willye Peter Daetwyler, d.b.a. Interamerican Airfreight Co., Foreign Permit, 58
C.A.B. 118 (1971).
82 Id. at 129.
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holders, directors, and officers), though United States citizens, were
also employees of other companies wholly owned by Daetwyler.33
The C.A.B. looked beyond the mere ownership percentages in
Interamerican Airfreight in attempting to determine whether the
carrier could be certified as a U.S. citizen. The Board found that the
relationship that existed between Daetwyler and the other members
of the corporation would allow him to exert too much control over
the carrier. The Board stated that the carrier would in fact be doing
business as part of Daetwyler's other companies. 4 On paper the
transaction appeared to fall within the requirements of the law; the
Board, however, denied the Interamerican Airfreight Company a
U.S. operating permit because of its substantial links with a foreign
national.
The C.A.B.'s restrictive stance toward foreign investments in
U.S. air carriers continued through the 1980 application of Silvas
Air Lines, Inc. for U.S. carrier certification.3 5 Silvas' application
was denied because of a foreign investor's veto power over loan dis-
bursements. Although the foreign investor owned only twenty-five
percent of the voting stock, the Board found that his requirement of
specific approval on fund disbursement from a loan he made to the
carrier amounted to actual control of the carrier.36 In the 1982 Pre-
miere Airlines Fitness Investigation, the C.A.B. approved a car-
rier's application for U.S. citizen certification only after one of its
co-founders resigned from the carrier's management and board of
directors. 8 Though a U.S. citizen, this individual had borrowed
money for the establishment of the company from his employer, a
Saudi Arabian citizen. 9 The Board held that as a result, the Saudi
Arabian citizen was in a position "to exert overriding influence and
control" over his employee, and therefore the carrier. 40 Once the co-
founder was removed from any influential posts in the corporation,
33 Id. at 128-129.
Id. at 131-133.
88 Silvas Airlines, Inc., Service Investigation [C.A.B., D.O.T., and N.T.S.B. Cases
1979-89 Transfer Binder] Aviation L. Rep. (CCH) 22,332.01 (Sept. 23, 1980).
36 Id. at 14,183.
11 Premiere Airlines, Fitness Investigation, C.A.B. Order No. 82-5-11 (1982).
I8 d. at 3.
39 Id. at 2.
40 Id.
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the C.A.B. found that the investor's influence was also removed, and
U.S. citizenship requirements were met.
In In re Page Avjet Corp.,4' the Board initially found that Page
did not meet the Federal Aviation Act's citizenship requirements
because a foreign investor held one hundred percent of the carrier's
non-voting stock, although his ownership of voting stock was within
the requisite limits. 42 The C.A.B. determined that as the company
was structured, the non-voting stock gave the foreign investor the
power to block a merger, consolidation, liquidation, and other major
company actions, thereby allowing him to control the company.
However, when the carrier established a buy-out provision where the
voting shareholders could buy back the non-voting shares if they
blocked a corporate action, the Board found the citizenship require-
ments had been met.43
In In the Matter of Intera Arctic Services, Inc. in 1987,44 the
D.O.T. (which by then had replaced the C.A.B.) reiterated its posi-
tion that mere compliance with the ownership percentage limits does
not necessarily establish that an air carrier is not under foreign con-
trol. The D.O.T. cited several points in refusing to certify Intera
Arctic Services as a U.S. carrier. These included the fact that for-
eign interests would receive most of the carrier's profits or assets in
a liquidation 4 and that two of Intera Arctic's directors, who to-
gether owned seventy-five percent of the company's voting stock,
were also directors of a foreign carrier which was obtaining an in-
terest in Intera Arctic. 4" The D.O.T. found that foreign interests
would essentially be running the carrier under these arrangements
and therefore denied U.S. certification.
4 In re Page Avjet Corp., 102 C.A.B. 488 (1983).
42 Id. at 1.
41 In re Page Avjet Corp., 102 C.A.B. 488 (1984).
44 In the Matter of Intera Arctic Services, Inc., [C.A.B., D.O.T., and N.T.S.B. Cases
1979-89 Transfer Binder] Aviation L. Rep. (CCH) 22,419 (Aug. 18, 1987).
45 Id. at 14,712.
46 Id.
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IV. CASE PRECEDENT SINCE THE LATE 1980S
A. The Economic Climate
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, conditions in the United
States and abroad favored large-scale cross-border airline alliances,
which until then had been almost unheard of.47
In the United States, a deepening recession, the Persian Gulf
War, sky-rocketing labor costs, and fierce fare wars had contributed
to the deterioration of the financial health of the airline industry.
Between 1989 and 1992, the industry lost $10 billion.4 8 Although
the "Big Three" U.S. carriers (United, American, and Delta) exper-
ienced record losses, the second tier of smaller U.S. airlines found
itself in dire straits. Eastern, Pan Am, and Midway were liquidated,
the bankruptcy cases of Continental, TWA, and America West
dragged on, and Northwest and USAir experienced severe financial
difficulties.
At the same time overseas, particularly in Europe, airlines were
looking for ways to compete on an equal footing with the growth of
the Big Three. Having secured their supremacy in the U.S. domestic
market,49 by 1989 the Big Three began to purchase the interna-
tional routes of their ailing domestic rivals in a bid for global domi-
nance.50 The Big Three's combined share of transatlantic traffic
went from 3 % a decade earlier to 69 % in 1992, with each carrying
'7 Marketing alliances between U.S. and foreign airlines also became popular, but do
not raise the citizenship issue because they include little, if any, equity investment. Such
agreements have been reached between Delta and Swissair (July, 1989), Delta and Singa-
pore Airlines (October, 1989), Continental and Air France (July, 1993), United and Luf-
thansa German Airlines (October, 1993), and others. Marketing alliances typically involve
merged frequent flyer programs, schedule coordination for cross-feeding of passengers, and
some code sharing (see infra note 85). See generally Tom Eblen, Asian Carrier and Delta
OK Marketing Deal, ATLANTA J., Oct. 27, 1989; U.S., France Forge Link, AVIATION WK.
& SPACE TECH., Aug. 2, 1993, at 39; Robert L. Rose and Bridget O'Brian, United, Luf-
thansa Form Marketing Tie, Dealing a Setback to American Airlines, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4,
1993, at A4.
48 Irwin M. Stelzer, Airlines' Wisdom of '80s Didn't Get Off the Ground, BOSTON
HERALD, Apr. 5, 1993, at 33.
'9 The Big Three increased their combined share of the U.S. domestic market from
38% in 1982 to 60% in 1992. Janice Castro, Air Wars, TIME, Nov. 23, 1992, at 38, 47.
50 Id. United purchased Pan Am's Latin American route network and Pan Am's U.S.
to London Heathrow routes, growing from no European service in 1989 to service to fifteen
cities in nine countries by 1993. American purchased TWA's routes from three U.S. gate-
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more passengers in 1992 than the entire European commercial fleet
combined. 51 While European carriers had hubs in their own coun-
tries that they used to connect local passengers to their U.S.-bound
transatlantic flights, they could in no way compare to the huge U.S.
hubs that the Big Three used to feed transatlantic flights. After all,
the U.S. domestic market represented over forty percent of the
world's airline traffic. 2 Restrictive aviation treaties, however, pro-
hibited foreign airlines from creating domestic hub systems in the
U.S. Only by aligning themselves with an already established U.S.
airline could foreign airlines connect the vast U.S. traffic base to
their own transatlantic flights.
Consequently, by the late 1980s, the weaker U.S. carriers, des-
perate for capital, and foreign airlines, seeking ways to combat the
international expansion of the Big Three, suddenly discovered that
they could work well together. They began to forge alliances that
tested the limits of U.S. laws on foreign ownership. In applying the
citizenship test to these cases, the Department of Transportation
continued to look beyond mere ownership percentages, closely study-
ing the terms of the investment deal to determine whether they di-
rectly or indirectly gave the foreign airline effective control over the
key activities of the U.S. carrier.
B. Northwest and KLM
The test case for a major foreign airline investment in a major
U.S. airline occurred in 1989 when KLM sought to participate in
Alfred Checchi's leveraged buy out of Northwest Airlines, the
United States' fourth largest carrier. As initially structured, the
deal provided for KLM to contribute 56.75 % ($400 million) of the
equity in Northwest's new holding company (Wings Holdings). This
amount represented non-voting stock. 53 As part of its investment,
KLM also had the right to name a three-person committee to advise
ways to London Heathrow and Eastern's Latin American route network. Delta purchased
Pan Am's transatlantic hubs at JFK and Frankfurt.
81 Id.
" USA Snapshots: Adding Airline Passengers, USA TODAY, Apr. 5, 1993, at B1.
" In the Matter of the Acquisition of Northwest Airlines by Wings Holdings, Inc.,
[Current D.O.T. and N.T.S.B. Cases] Aviation L. Rep. (CCH) 22,513, at 15,162 (Sept.
29, 1989).
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Northwest on the management of its financial affairs.54 There were
no restrictions placed on the extent of the advice or the power
wielded by this committee.
The D.O.T. found both the equity and financial committee pro-
visions of the deal to be in violation of the control prong of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act's citizenship test. The D.O.T. ruled that as struc-
tured, the deal would allow KLM to be "in a position to exercise
control over Northwest, and that the latter would thereby cease to
be a U.S. citizen for the purposes of the Federal Aviation Act."55
The D.O.T. stated that KLM's stock in Wings, though non-
voting, was equity representing a genuine ownership interest. Be-
cause of the large dollar investment, KLM would be inclined to
oversee Northwest's decisions closely, and would have a high incen-
tive to participate in the airline's business decisions.56 The D.O.T.
stated that KLM would be able to exert substantial control over
Northwest by preventing the issuance by Wings of securities for
purposes of liquidation, dissolution, or dividends. KLM could also
block any amendments to the Certificates of Incorporation or Desig-
nation that would "materially and adversely affect the specified des-
ignations, preferences, or special right of its preferred stock."5 As
to KLM's power to appoint a three-person financial committee, the
D.O.T. felt that it would give KLM influence over senior manage-
ment on matters concerning the airline's financial affairs which
could extend throughout the company.
The D.O.T. stated that it would adhere to stricter scrutiny in
cases where a foreign investor in a U.S. carrier is an airline,5 8 since
"if that foreign carrier is also an actual or potential competitor, it
may well have an interest in attempting to exercise control over the
U.S. carrier. . . ."" Ultimately, the D.O.T. issued a consent order
requiring KLM's interest in Northwest to be limited to twenty-five
percent of equity and that the financial advisory committee be elimi-
54 Id.
55 Id. at 15,163.
56 Id. at 15,162.
87 Id.
8 Id.
so Id. at 15,162-15,163.
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nated. The D.O.T. also required the recusal of KLM's Wings board
member from certain sensitive board responsibilities.' 0
A year later, Northwest applied to the D.O.T. for the relaxa-
tion of the terms of the D.O.T.'s 1989 consent order for the North-
west/KLM transaction. Still in need of cash, Northwest asked for
permission to allow KLM to increase its non-voting equity owner-
ship of Wings to forty-nine percent and to permit KLM to designate
three members of the Wings board of directors, which was being
increased from twelve to fifteen members. 61
The D.O.T., perhaps surprisingly, granted both of these re-
quests. It stated that it had reassessed "the complexities of today's
corporate and financial environment," and had reexamined "the re-
lationship between nonvoting equity/debt and control in light of our
recent experience in this area, and our observations of who controls
Northwest since the Wings acquisition."62
With respect to Northwest's request that KLM be allowed to
increase its non-voting equity to forty-nine percent, the D.O.T. un-
dertook a detailed review of who was actually in charge of the oper-
ations at Northwest. The D.O.T. concluded that the Checchi group
held the key positions in the company and made all the important
managerial decisions. 63 The D.O.T. said "we see no potential for the
foreign interest represented by KLM to exert control ... ."" Simi-
larly, the D.O.T. believed that the increase in the number of direc-
tors on the board would preclude foreign control of the airline. The
D.O.T. stated that the chairman could not be a foreign citizen, that
subcommittees of the board must have their KLM membership lim-
ited, and it extended to all KLM representatives on the Wings
board the recusal requirements on certain board issues that it im-
posed in the earlier consent order. 65 However, the D.O.T. stressed
that the underlying foundation of its favorable attitude toward
0 Id. at 15,163. KLM's representation on the board of directors was restricted with
respect to access to information and involvement in competitively sensitive matters being
considered by Northwest. Id. at 15,160.
01 In the Matter of the Acquisition of Northwest Airlines, Inc. by Wings Holdings,
Inc., Order No. 91-1-41, 1991 WL 247884 (D.O.T.) at *3.
62 Id. at *5.
63 Id.
" Id,
65 Id. at *7. See supra note 60.
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Northwest's requests was the liberal bilateral agreement in place be-
tween the United States and the Netherlands. 6
While taking a more expansive view of foreign ownership of
U.S. airline non-voting equity, the D.O.T. emphasized that the
twenty-five percent limit on voting stock is still good law. It stressed
that increased membership of foreign nationals on Wings' board was
acceptable as long as they exerted no influence on key decisions or
day-to-day management of the firm. Additionally, in emphasizing
the importance of the Netherlands' liberal aviation policy in its deci-
sion to relax the restrictions on KLM's investment in Northwest, the
United States was for the first time linking freer foreign investment
to freer international route rights.
In 1992, the D.O.T. went one step further when it officially de-
fined "Open Skies" agreements (in which two nations drop all avia-
tion restrictions between them) and solicited foreign nations to enter
into such agreements with the United States.6 The United States
promised to provide antitrust immunity to foreign carriers who
wished to combine services with a U.S. carrier, if their home coun-
tries signed Open Skies agreements with the United States.68
The Netherlands rushed to be the first country to reach such an
accord with the United States.69 Shortly thereafter, the D.O.T. ap-
proved Northwest and KLM's request to merge functions and to act
as one airline, cooperating in "crucial" areas such as pricing and
strategy, 7  and granted KLM and Northwest antitrust immunity. It
Order No. 91-1-41, supra note 61, at *4, *6.
67 The U.S. defined Open Skies according to the following criteria: 1) Open entry on
all routes; 2) Unrestricted route and traffic rights; 3) Liberalized price setting; 4) Liberal
charter arrangements; 5) Liberal cargo regime; 6) Prompt conversion of earnings to hard
currency and prompt remission to homeland; 7) Open code sharing; 8) Rights to control
airport functions; 9) Pro-competitive provisions on commercial opportunities; and 10) Non-
discriminatory operation and access for computer reservation systems. See Mead Jennings,
Defining an Open Skies Concept, AIRLINE Bus., Sept. 1992, at 129.
" Id.
" Mead Jennings, Open Skies Headway, AIRLINE Bus., Aug. 1992, at 14. Other
countries were not as eager. France, Germany, and Italy were seeking more restrictions on
their agreements with the United States. See Mead Jennings, An Open and Shut Case,
AIRLINE Bus., Oct. 1992 at 14.
1* Agis Salpukas, U.S. Backs Merger of Northwest Air and Dutch Carrier, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 1992, at Al. The airlines also planned to create a joint identity by "operat-
ing under the same trademark and using the same branding for aircraft exteriors and interi-
ors, uniforms, vehicles, and stationery." Id. at C3.
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was the first time that a foreign and a domestic carrier "would have
the ability to function as one carrier even though legally they would
remain separate companies. 11 1
C. Continental and SAS
During the summer of 1990, Scandinavian Airlines System
(SAS) proposed to increase its nominal holdings in Continental Air-
lines (the nation's fifth largest airline) to 16.8 % of common equity,
representing 18.4% of voting power.72 SAS would also hold three of
the fifteen seats on Continental's holding company's board of direc-
tors.73 Paying special attention to the D.O.T.'s Northwest ruling, the
Continental/SAS agreement limited the power SAS' board mem-
bers would have over decisions being made at Continental .7  The
D.O.T. approved the plan, concluding that "SAS does not have a
sufficient stake to direct the affairs of the company, nor can it exer-
cise a veto over corporate actions. Also, the dollar value of the SAS
acquisition is not so large as to raise concerns that, by reason of the
sheer size of its cash infusion, SAS could exercise control. ' 5
D. USAir and British Airways
In 1992, British Airways (BA) announced plans to invest $750
million in cash in USAir, the sixth largest airline in the United
States, in exchange for forty-four percent of USAir's common eq-
uity and twenty-one percent of USAir's voting stocky.7 This proposal
11 Id. at Al. It was hoped that this step would strengthen the alliance, which until
then had been a "tremendous profit drain for KLM and [had] yielded little in synergies."
See Keith L. Alexander and Seth Payne, USAir: This 'Dog' May Be Having Its Day, Bus.
WK., June 21, 1993, at 74, 76.
11 In the Matter of the Acquisition of Stock in Continental Airlines Holdings, Inc., by
Scandinavian Airlines System, [Current D.O.T. and N.T.S.B. Cases] Aviation L. Rep.
(CCH) 11 22,588, at 15,403 (Sept. 12, 1990).
Id. at 15,403.
The D.O.T. looked favorably upon these self-imposed limitations on SAS' directors.
The limitations included limiting membership on the Continental Holdings Board's Nomi-
nating and Executive Committees to only one SAS director. Id. at 15,405.
71 Id. at 15,404.
11 BA's investment would have reduced USAir's debt from $2.19 billion to $1.44 bil-
lion. James T. McKenna, USAir-BA Pact Will Spark New Transatlantic Battle, AVIATION
WK. & SPACE TECH., July 27, 1992, at 26.
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immediately attracted much attention, because of its high dollar
value and because BA was already one of the largest international
airlines in the world.
The airline resulting from the combination of USAir and Brit-
ish Airways would have ranked first in the world in destinations
served (linking three hundred thirty-nine destinations in seventy-one
countries) and third in revenue passenger miles (RPMs) (behind
American and United).77 BA and USAir planned to integrate opera-
tions under a global master brand, with three regional sub-brands:
Intercontinental, North America, and Europe. The deal would
have given British Airways direct access to U.S. domestic travelers,
via USAir flights,79 particularly in USAir's east coast stronghold,
where two-thirds of U.S. transatlantic journeys originate.8 0 The deal
would have also given USAir access to BA's valuable international
traffic. Having lost $973 million since 1989, it was unclear whether
USAir had a viable future without a foreign partner.8 1
The Big Three U.S. carriers and Federal Express assembled an
unprecedented unified opposition front against the deal, 2 calling it
77 Castro, supra note 49, at 38, 47. Revenue passenger miles is the gauge used by
airlines to measure traffic.
78 Richard Whitaker, BA Awaits Decision, AIRLINE Bus., Dec. 1992, at 11.
" The practice of cabotage, when a foreign carrier flies within another country's do-
mestic market, is prohibited by U.S. law. But by linking up with USAir, BA would gain
access to U.S. domestic markets via USAir's own flights. See infra note 85 on code sharing.
80 Richard Whitaker and Mead Jennings, Airlines Oppose BA's U.S. Deal, AIRLINE
Bus., Sept. 1992, at 30. Yet, in 1992 American, United, and Delta had 664 weekly nonstop
transatlantic departures, versus 177 for BA and 42 for USAir. See Bill Poling and Jennifer
Dorsey, Perot's Attack on Airlines' Pacts Draws Reaction from USAir, NWA, TRAVEL
WKLY., Oct. 22, 1992, at 51.
81 Castro, supra note 49, at 47. Analysts differed as to whether USAir's domestic
system was viable in the long run without a foreign partner. Key strategic purchases begin-
ning in 1991, including the Trump Shuttle, New York LaGuardia takeoff and landing slots
and terminal space, combined with a focus on "Big East" flying out of New York, Boston,
and Washington National's business markets, and wage concessions were seen as positive
steps. See James T. McKenna, USAir Expands Northeast Service in Effort to Regain Prof-
itability, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Jan. 27, 1992, at 58.
82 The United Kingdom and the United States had widely divergent points of view
with regard to BA's proposal. United Kingdom: "If any [U.K. airline] wants to put money
into a U.S. carrier, the U.S. air transport industry should be grateful. It's a bit rich asking
for concessions." United States: "A BA stake in USAir is seen as a 'Trojan horse' approach
to obtaining full U.S. cabotage rights." Mead Jennings, BA Stakes Out USAir, AIRLINE
Bus., Aug. 1992, at 10.
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"tantamount to unilateral economic disarmament."83 Their main
point of contention was that as a result of the deal, British Airways
would be given access to the riches of the U.S. market through
USAir, while U.S. carriers would still be locked out of the United
Kingdom since its bilateral aviation agreement with the U.S. was
extremely restrictive.84 The Big Three claimed that since British
Airways would be able to combine operations with USAir,' 5 it
would be the only carrier with gateways on both sides of the Atlan-
tic, and it would have a monopoly on 8,000 origin and destination
markets in which U.S. carriers could not compete.86 For example,
only BA/USAir would be able to provide single carrier service be-
tween San Diego and Nairobi, Denver and Capetown, Austin and
Riyadh87 or Indianapolis and Dhaka, Bangladesh." The Big Three
predicted that they would lose "about $500 million within a few
years" if the deal were approved. 9 Opponents of the proposal also
contended that once inside the United States, the British would lose
all incentive to negotiate for Open Skies."
The U.S. carriers demanded that the U.S. government seek
concessions from the British in return for approval of the deal:
" Richard Whitaker and Mead Jennings, Airlines Oppose BA's U.S. Deal, AIRLINE
Bus., Sept. 1992, at 30.
Mead Jennings, An Open and Shut Case, AIRLINE Bus., Oct. 1992, at 14. The
British had a history of being "cold-bloodedly mercantilistic" in aviation for fifty years.
They rejected President Roosevelt's plan for universal open skies in 1944 at the Chicago
Convention. Her Majesty's Sky, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 1992, at A12.
" While still separate companies, BA and USAir would "code share." That means
that in its reservations system, BA would be able to sell trips with connections to USAir
flights under the BA code instead of the USAir code. This would allow passengers to make
connections between the two airlines without having the sense that they are switching be-
tween carriers. (Most agree that passengers overwhelmingly prefer to stay on the same air-
line when they are making connections. Robert L. Crandall, Open Skies for BA and KLM if
for U.S. Airlines Too, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 1992, at A14.) Code sharing would therefore
have the effect of steering passengers away from competitors and feeding them between BA
and USAir in their combined system. Castro, supra note 49, at 47.
8 Talking Tough, AIRLINE Bus., Nov. 1992, at 61.
87 Robert L. Crandall, Open Skies for BA and KLM if for U.S. Airlines Too, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 23, 1992, at A14.
" To this last example, a USAir senior official countered that traffic in that city pair
is only two people per month, i.e. negligible. Bill Poling, United, American Spar with USAir,
BA Over Proposed Deal, TRAVEL WKLY., Nov. 12, 1992, at 49.
" Bridget O'Brian and Laurie McGinley, Mixing of U.S., Foreign Carriers Alters
Market, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 1992, at BI.
SO Crandall, supra note 85.
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"When British Airways and the U.K. government are ready to give
U.S. carriers the same rights in British Airways markets that Brit-
ish Airways seeks in U.S. markets, we will withdraw all objections
to [the] proposed investment."91 However, at least one U.S. carrier,
American Airlines, indicated that gaining access to the domestic
U.K. market or even the larger intra-European Community (EC)
market was not a fair trade. American cited the strength of Eu-
rope's ground transportation network, the lack of acceptable facili-
ties to sustain high frequency traffic at European airports, and the
fact that only ten to twelve percent of the world market belongs to
the EC (versus over forty percent for the United States) as reasons
why U.K. or EC access would not be a fair trade.92 American was
more interested in gaining rights to fly from London to Nairobi,
South Africa, and other lucrative long haul destinations.9" U.S. car-
riers also wanted the right to buy into U.K. airlines as BA was able
to buy into USAir. Under current EC rules, a U.S. carrier cannot
buy into a U.K. carrier and have the level of control that BA had
built into the USAir deal.94
Apart from the tremendous opposition to the deal from the Big
Three, its structure presented several problems vis a vis the control
prong of the U.S. citizenship test. The percentages of USAir equity
and voting stock BA sought to acquire clearly fell within the limits
set forth by U.S. law. BA and USAir officials admitted that if it
were not for these limits, they would have discussed a merger in-
stead of an alliance.95 A major roadblock to the deal, however,
proved to be a super majority provision that gave BA four seats on
USAir's sixteen member board. Major decisions had to be approved
by eighty percent of the board, giving BA effective veto power over
aircraft acquisitions, the appointment and salaries of key officers,96
operating and capital budgets, and spending of more than $10 mil-
" A Message to the U.S. Public about Fair Trade, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1992, at A9.
" Talking Tough, AIRLINE Bus., Nov. 1992, at 63.
9" Id.
9 Id.
11 James T. McKenna, USAir-BA Pact Will Spark New Transatlantic Battle, AVIA-
TION WK. & SPACE TECH., July 27, 1992, at 26.
" Christopher P. Fotos, American, Delta to Fight USAir Pact if British Fail to Offer
Concessions, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Aug. 10, 1992, at 32.
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lion.97 Adding fuel to the fire, British Airways called this part of the
deal "non-negotiable." 98
The provisions of the investment proposal gave British Airways
the potential to effectively control USAir, much like the provisions
of the original Northwest/KLM plan gave KLM too much control
of Northwest. Realizing that the deal could be rejected by the
D.O.T., in a last ditch effort to get it approved, the British govern-
ment accelerated talks with the United States to liberalize the U.K.-
U.S. bilateral aviation treaty. The Netherlands had just signed an
Open Skies pact with the United States, leading to the immediate
approval of KLM's plan to fully integrate its operations with North-
west, and the U.S. indicated that similar action by the U.K. would
lead to approval of the BA/USAir proposal.
The negotiations, however, were not successful. The United
Kingdom refused to drop protectionist barriers on U.S. carrier ac-
cess to London, the most desirable destination in Britain.99 In the
face of certain rejection by the United States, British Airways with-
drew its investment proposal. The United States had, at least infor-
mally, established a "new litmus test for cross-border investments
when management control of an airline comes into question . . . [:
t]he U.S. will now require an Open Skies agreement with the for-
eign airline's government."100
One month after the withdrawal of its $750 million proposal,
British Airways in early 1993 announced a revised proposal to invest
$300 million in USAir."' In return for its investment, BA would
receive three seats on USAir's sixteen member board, 24.6% of to-
tal equity, and a 21.8% voting stock share.102 Also, BA and USAir
" Richard Whitaker and Mead Jennings, Airlines Oppose BA's U.S. Deal, AIRLINE
Bus., Sept. 1992, at 30.
8 BA's chief executive, Sir Colin Marshall, has stated "You couldn't possibly invest
$750 million in an airline and not have that kind of control so that you can veto certain
financial investments." Kevin O'Toole, BA Insists on USAir Boardroom Veto, FLIGHT
INT'L, Nov. 25-Dec. 1, 1992, at 8.
" R.W. Stevenson, British Air Drops Plan to Purchase Stake in USAir, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 23, 1992, at D2.
100 James Ott, U.S. Sets Litmus Test for Foreign Investments, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., Jan. 4, 1993 at 30.




would consummate a plan similar to the earlier proposal whereby
both carriers would integrate their services, feeding each other's
flights to and from thirty-eight U.S. cities by the end of 1993, and
up to eighty U.S. cities and towns by the end of 1995."'3 The new
deal included an option for further investment by BA of $450 mil-
lion in USAir by 1998 under the terms of the earlier proposal if
U.S. government approval could be obtained. 0
To the consternation of the Big Three, BA's new proposal did
not violate the control prong of the U.S. citizenship test. The level
of control that BA had built into its new deal was substantially less
than that set forth by the super majority provisions of the defeated
proposal. As a result, the D.O.T. approved the investment.' 06 But it
limited its approval of the duration of the cooperative operations be-
tween the two carriers to one year, pending the consummation of a
liberal aviation pact between the United States and the United
Kingdom. The Secretary of Transportation described his tentative
approval as "the hook"' 0 6 for drawing the British into an Open
Skies agreement with the United States: "My objective is to use,
[the BA-USAir proposal] as a vehicle in rewriting the current bilat-
eral agreement with [the United Kingdom]. ' '" °7
E. Continental and Air Canada
Despite capital infusions from SAS, by 1992 Continental Air-
lines was in bankruptcy, searching for new investors to bail it out. 08
Air Canada proposed to inject $450 million in Continental in ex-
change for 27.5 % of the reorganized Continental's equity and 24%
'" Keith L. Alexander and Seth Payne, USAir: This 'Dog' May Be Having Its Day,
Bus. WK., June 21, 1993, at 76.
104 BA Invests $300 Million in USAir, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Jan. 25, 1993,
at 31.
'0 Bruce Ingersoll, U.S. Approves British Air Stake in USAir Group, WALL ST. J.,
March 16, 1993, at A3.
106 Id.
10 Mead Jennings, Pena Unlocks Bermuda 2, AIRLINE Bus., Apr. 1993, at 8.
'01 SAS' ownership stake in the company had been wiped out by the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, and SAS lost $100 million on its investment. See Keith L. Alexander and Seth
Payne, USAir: This 'Dog' May Be Having Its Day, Bus. WK., June 21, 1993, at 74, 76.
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of its voting stock.1"9 Air Canada's partners in the deal, Air Part-
ners L.P., a Fort Worth investment group, would acquire 27.5 % of
Continental's equity and 41 % of the voting stock. 110 Air Canada's
bid for Continental won over competing bids by Aeromexico and a
Houston investor,1 ' and a withdrawn bid by Lufthansa German
Airlines and Marvin Davis." 2
Air Canada's investment team worked closely with D.O.T. offi-
cials to structure their investment deal within the requirements of
U.S. air carrier citizenship law.'1 Super majority provisions were
eliminated to avoid the problems of the first BA/USAir proposal.1 4
Because Air Canada's partner was a major U.S. investment group
and the U.S.-Canada bilateral relationship was less offensive than
the U.S.-U.K. relationship, the control prong of the U.S. citizenship
test was not violated and the D.O.T. ultimately approved Air Can-
ada's proposal."'
The Air Canada/Continental deal did not attract as much at-
tention as the BA/USAir proposal, because "the Canadian market
[was] not as hotly pursued as the destinations involved" in the lat-
ter. 1 ' Through the alliance, Air Canada gained access to Continen-
tal's U.S. traffic base, particularly its Newark hub, 7 although the
U.S.-Canada agreement does not allow code sharing to the great
extent of the U.S.-U.K. agreement.' Besides coordinating sched-
ules, Continental and Air Canada planned to share computer tech-
100 David A. Brown, Air Canada Group Wins Bidding War for Continental, AVIA-
TION WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 16, 1992, at 26.
110 Id. at 27.
I d.
112 David A. Brown, Continental Board to Name Winning Bid, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., Nov. 9, 1992 at 34.
"8 Mead Jennings, One Flew East, One Flew West, AIRLNE Bus., Feb. 1993, at 21.
114 Id.
110 Id.
11 Castro, supra note 49, at 47.
117 Christopher J. Chipello, Midsize Air Canada Plots Survival in Industry of Giants,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 1992, at B4.
118 Continental Accepts Bid from Investors, TRAVEL WKLY., Nov. 12, 1992, at 4. Air
Canada's chairman had stated that gaining a larger share of U.S.-Canada traffic was one of
his most important objectives. See Christopher J. Chipello, Midsize Air Canada Plots Sur-
vival in Industry of Giants, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 1992, at B4. During its partnership with
SAS, Continental and SAS fed each other four hundred passengers a day at Newark. See
Continental Accepts Bid from Investors, TRAVEL WKLY., Nov. 12, 1992, at 4.
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nology11 and Air Canada hoped to win some of Continental's main-
tenance contracts.12 For Continental, the agreement meant the end
of Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and increased access to Canadian
passengers.
V. CONCLUSION
The national security concerns of the 1950s that underlaid the
1958 Federal Aviation Act's foreign ownership restrictions are no
longer valid. The U.S. government's primary goals today should be
to protect U.S. economic interests at home and abroad, by permit-
ting U.S. carriers to benefit from foreign capital and expanded in-
ternational route rights.
The recommendation of the Commission to Ensure a Strong
Competitive Airline Industry, advocating an increase in the foreign
investor voting equity cap to forty-nine percent, would further these
goals. Requiring that a country enact a liberal bilateral aviation
treaty with the United States in exchange for the higher equity cap
would assure that U.S. carriers receive rights abroad commensurate
with the benefits a U.S. carrier would give a foreign forty-nine per-
cent shareholder.
If Congress does change the numerical standards of the citizen-
ship test, however, the D.O.T. will have to loosen the control prong
of the test as well. The acceptable level of control should be in line
with that of a large (forty-nine percent) rather than a small
(twenty-five percent) minority owner. It is difficult to imagine a sit-
uation in which an investor would agree to buy forty-nine percent of
a corporation, but have no say in its major operating decisions.
Without a change in the control prong of the citizenship test,
the original BA/USAir proposal that permitted BA's representa-
tives on USAir's board to block major decisions would still be ille-
gal. Even KLM, which has been given permission to operate jointly
with Northwest in every way, would continue to be prohibited from
having a say in Northwest's day-to-day operations.
I"' Bridget O'Brian, Continental Air to Submit Plan to Court Today, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 16, 1992, at A4.
120 Christopher J. Chipello, Midsize Air Canada Plots Survival in Industry of Giants,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 1992, at B4.
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The debate on foreign investment in U.S. airlines will not end
soon. It is likely that the current administration will pursue the
Commission to Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry's rec-
ommendation through Congress. Discussions between the United
States and the United Kingdom on an Open Skies agreement will
continue, and the result of those talks may have a significant effect
on future U.S. government policy on foreign investment in the U.S.
airline industry. In the meantime, U.S. air carriers will continue to
court foreign airlines, further eroding the global airline industry's
economic and political boundaries.
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